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NEW: Lithuanian officials continue warning of a possible Russian false-flag operation against NATO’s eastern flank using seized Ukrainian drones. Other Key Takeaways: Russia continues to form combat units using Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in direct violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Ukrainian Brigadier General Serhiy Sobko has reportedly assumed the post of the acting Ukrainian Armed Forces deputy commander-in-chief. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 5 to 6. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russia launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles, two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and 101 drones against Ukraine overnight.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085515792313987264#m

Published: August 6, 2026 23:58

NEW: Lithuanian officials continue warning of a possible Russian false-flag operation against NATO’s eastern flank using seized Ukrainian drones. Other Key Takeaways: Russia continues to form combat units using Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in direct…

Pinned: NEW: Iranian regime media claimed that the emerging Iran-Oman deal would enable Iran to maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz. Any agreement that grants Iran control over the strait would be detrimental to US and global commercial interests. Achieving international recognition of its control over the strait would enable Iran to use the strait as a deterrent against its adversaries in potential future conflicts. Other Key Takeaways: Iran continues to use force to consolidate its control of the strait. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 5 that a vessel’s crew heard two explosions while passing through Omani territorial waters. Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely attempting to deter the Syrian government from disrupting smuggling routes used to support Hezbollah. Iran likely believes that continued Syrian government efforts to disrupt Hezbollah smuggling routes in Syria represent Syrian cooperation with Israel and the United States against Hezbollah when, in reality, Syria is exercising its sovereign right to secure its borders. ISW-CTP is considering two possible courses of action for Iran in Syria. The Syrian government has deployed an increased number of forces to the Syria-Iraq border to support border security in response to Iranian and Axis of Resistance threats and activity. The activities of Iran and the Axis of Resistance across the region, including their reported actions in Syria, are likely causing an increasing alignment of interests between different regional states. The Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) military camps in Marib and Hadramawt governorates on August 6, possibly in response to ROYG ground movements near Houthi frontlines.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085499085625151766#m

Published: August 6, 2026 22:51

NEW: Iranian regime media claimed that the emerging Iran-Oman deal would enable Iran to maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz. Any agreement that grants Iran control over the strait would be detrimental to US and global commercial interests. Achieving…

MORE: Russian occupation officials continue to struggle to adequately respond to worsening water, food, and electricity shortages in occupied areas that are partially a result of Ukraine’s intensified intermediate-range strike campaign. The situation in occupied Crimea is particularly severe — Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 3 that 1.4 million residents of the occupied peninsula were left without power during the week of July 14 to 20 alone. International humanitarian law requires Russia, as the belligerent occupying power, to ensure public order, civil life, and the provision of essential supplies and services in the territory it occupies, even if infrastructure disruptions are a result of legitimate Ukrainian military action.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085433222196765059#m

Published: August 6, 2026 18:30

MORE: Russian occupation officials continue to struggle to adequately respond to worsening water, food, and electricity shortages in occupied areas that are partially a result of Ukraine’s intensified intermediate-range strike campaign. The situation in…

NEW: Russian federal- and regional-level authorities organized the temporary deportation of teenagers from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Russia’s Penza Oblast to participate in a federally administered military-patriotic training course. Other Key Takeaways: Russia continues to deport female Ukrainian political prisoners from penal colonies in occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration continues efforts to consolidate a loyal staff cadre at the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) using youth training programs. Occupation authorities are using the population of occupied areas to staff BARS (Combat Reserve) units to protect the Russian rear in occupied Ukraine. The Kremlin has further cemented the Russian Unified Public Services portal (Gosuslugi) as a tool of digital governance control in occupied Ukraine. Russian occupation officials continue to struggle to adequately respond to worsening water, food, and electricity shortages in occupied areas. Russian law enforcement and occupation courts continue to harshly punish residents of occupied territories for perceived affiliation with Ukraine. Russian officials are intensifying efforts to attract investment and economic activity in occupied Ukraine despite growing security risks from Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign, while concurrently incentivizing relocation to occupied areas. The Russian satellite TV project “Russkiy Mir” continues efforts to proliferate throughout occupied Ukraine.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085395711743467528#m

Published: August 6, 2026 16:00

NEW: Russian federal- and regional-level authorities organized the temporary deportation of teenagers from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Russia’s Penza Oblast to participate in a federally administered military-patriotic training course. Other Key Takeaways:…

MORE: The emerging Iran-Oman arrangement will reportedly give Iran a greater role in controlling traffic through the strait than Iran had before the war. Axios reported on August 4 that the agreement stipulates that inbound vessels will travel through Iranian waters, while outbound vessels will use a route through Omani waters “in coordination with Iran” for sixty days while mines are cleared from the recognized transit scheme.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085365283812774052#m

Published: August 6, 2026 14:00

MORE: The emerging Iran-Oman arrangement will reportedly give Iran a greater role in controlling traffic through the strait than Iran had before the war. Axios reported on August 4 that the agreement stipulates that inbound vessels will travel through…

MORE: Russian forces launched a relatively small strike package against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5, nonetheless causing significant civilian damage and casualties due to Russia’s use of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles that Ukraine was unable to intercept. The Russian strikes inflicted high civilian casualties, killing at least 16 people and injuring at least 29 in Kyiv Oblast alone. Ukrainian forces did not intercept any of the 28 missiles that Russia launched, as Russia continues to purposefully exploit Ukraine’s depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085342628858446084#m

Published: August 6, 2026 12:30

MORE: Russian forces launched a relatively small strike package against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5, nonetheless causing significant civilian damage and casualties due to Russia’s use of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles that Ukraine was…

Pinned: NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin reshuffled military commanders, including those associated with logistics and Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), against the backdrop of Ukrainian strike campaigns that these services have failed to defend against. Other Key Takeaways: Russian forces launched a relatively small strike package against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5 nonetheless causing significant civilian damage and casualties due to Russia’s use of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles that Ukraine was unable to intercept. Ukrainian forces did not intercept any of the 28 missiles that Russia launched overnight, as Russia continues to purposefully exploit Ukraine’s depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors. North Korea has escalated its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine, reportedly deploying missileers and over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia. The addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia’s arsenal will likely allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks. Unspecified actors likely piloted a drone containing explosives at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport, a known hub for transporting Western-provided military equipment to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaigns against Wildberries warehouses and Russian oil infrastructure on August 4 and 5. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and Slovyansk and Oleksandrivka directions on August 4 and 5.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085184065385243004#m

Published: August 6, 2026 01:59

NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin reshuffled military commanders, including those associated with logistics and Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), against the backdrop of Ukrainian strike campaigns that these services have failed to defend…

Pinned: NEW: The factional nature of Iranian decisionmaking is likely slowing Tehran’s approval of the draft Iran-Oman agreement covering vessel traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. There are conflicting reports of whether the regime has finalized the draft agreement. Iran is likely linking any lifting of restrictions on traffic through the strait to both US economic and strait-related concessions. Lifting restrictions on the strait without US concessions would weaken Iran’s bargaining position in negotiations while leaving the US blockade, sanctions, and other economic pressure in place.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085154975840170047#m

Published: August 6, 2026 00:04

NEW: The factional nature of Iranian decisionmaking is likely slowing Tehran’s approval of the draft Iran-Oman agreement covering vessel traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. There are conflicting reports of whether the regime has finalized the draft agreement.…

MORE: The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched an unspecified number of KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) between July 29 and 30. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 30 that Russia used a North Korean missile against Ukraine, which would mark the first such use since August 2025. ISW has assessed that Russia has increased the number of ballistic missiles in its long-range strike packages to capitalize on Ukraine’s shortage of high-end interceptors capable of countering ballistic missiles. This could increase the importance of North Korean military aid to Russia if Russia seeks to sustain a higher rate of ballistic missile attacks against Ukraine. An anonymous military source told Reuters on July 30 that North Korean missiles had greater ranges and larger warheads than Russia’s Iskander SRBM, but were inferior in accuracy. North Korea will likely benefit from increased use of its SRBMs in Russia’s long-range strike campaign. ISW-CDOT previously reported that North Korean missiles have received substantial improvements in accuracy and overall combat performance during the war in Ukraine.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085048184934379934#m

Published: August 5, 2026 17:00

MORE: The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched an unspecified number of KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) between July 29 and 30. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 30 that Russia used a North Korean missile…

MORE: Iran’s broader military establishment maintains its position against significant concessions over the Strait of Hormuz because they assess that Iran can outlast the United States in the war. The supreme leader’s military adviser, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, told regime media on August 3 that Iran should not abandon its control over the strait, while claiming that Iran’s drone and missile attacks on US regional bases have compelled US commanders, forces, and equipment further out of the region.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085040635979911445#m

Published: August 5, 2026 16:30

MORE: Iran’s broader military establishment maintains its position against significant concessions over the Strait of Hormuz because they assess that Iran can outlast the United States in the war. The supreme leader’s military adviser, Major General…

MORE: Western reporting on August 3 and 4, citing regional mediators, suggests that US and Qatari mediators have floated a compromise to return traffic through the strait to pre-war levels – a US objective – under which inbound traffic would transit through Iranian waters, while outbound traffic would pass through Omani waters. US and regional officials made it clear in these talks that this system would not involve tolls, according to these reports.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085010436399702374#m

Published: August 5, 2026 14:30

MORE: Western reporting on August 3 and 4, citing regional mediators, suggests that US and Qatari mediators have floated a compromise to return traffic through the strait to pre-war levels – a US objective – under which inbound traffic would transit…

MORE: Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted at least 100 successful strikes against Russia in its initial 40-day strike operation against a wide target set, likely intending to generate several separate and sometimes mutually reinforcing effects that all aim to increase the cost to Russian President Vladimir Putin of continuing to wage war on Ukraine. Ukraine’s escalating strike campaigns against Russian military, logistics, DIB, and economic assets include far more than the SBU strikes. Ukrainian forces have struck at least 19 Wildberries warehouses across Russia since the first strike against Wildberries facilities on July 18. Ukrainian forces have reportedly conducted at least 200 strikes against Russian cargo ships and oil tankers in the Black and Azov seas and at least 24 oil and gasoline infrastructure objects, degrading Russia’s refining capacity by at least one third. Ukraine’s strike campaigns are increasing the strain on Russian businesses, people, and air defenses. Bloomberg reported on August 4 that Ukraine’s strikes forced Russia to export near-record amounts of crude oil as Russia’s oil refining capacity reached the lowest rates since May 2002.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2085002888997126324#m

Published: August 5, 2026 14:00

MORE: Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted at least 100 successful strikes against Russia in its initial 40-day strike operation against a wide target set, likely intending to generate several separate and sometimes mutually reinforcing effects that…

MORE: US officials, including US President Donald Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, continue to insist that the strait must remain open to international shipping and not be subject to Iranian control. Western reporting on August 3 and 4, citing regional mediators, suggests that US and Qatari mediators have floated a compromise to return traffic through the strait to pre-war levels – a US objective – under which inbound traffic would transit through Iranian waters, while outbound traffic would pass through Omani waters. US and regional officials made it clear in these talks that this system would not involve tolls, according to these reports. Western media also reported on August 4, citing regional mediators and a senior Iranian source, that Iranian diplomats sought to retain maritime monitoring and intervention rights while demanding “service fees,” blockade relief, and sanctions relief, however. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry is concurrently framing talks over this arrangement as an issue to be managed between Iran and Oman rather than part of broader US-Iran negotiations. Iran’s negotiating team may be framing these talks as such to avoid the appearance of agreeing to a US-brokered plan over the strait and of conceding to the United States, to its domestic audience, amid pressure from other negotiation-skeptical regime factions.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084821695727018298#m

Published: August 5, 2026 02:00

MORE: US officials, including US President Donald Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, continue to insist that the strait must remain open to international shipping and not be subject to Iranian control. Western reporting on August 3 and 4, citing…

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Aug 4, 2026: Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted at least 100 successful strikes against Russia in its initial 40-day strike operation against a wide target set, likely intending to generate several separate and sometimes mutually reinforcing effects that all aim to increase the cost to Russian President Vladimir Putin of continuing to wage war on Ukraine. Other Key Takeaways: Ukraine’s strike campaigns are increasing the strain on Russian businesses, people, and air defenses. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Russian forces launched one ballistic missile and over 100 long-range strike drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military assets on August 4.(1/2)

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084792089921900763#m

Published: August 5, 2026 00:02

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Aug 4, 2026: Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted at least 100 successful strikes against Russia in its initial 40-day strike operation against a wide target set, likely intending to generate several separate…

Pinned: Iran Update Special Report, August 4, 2026: US officials and Iranian negotiators continue to present competing interpretations of the emerging arrangement on the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians’ inconsistent messaging in these negotiations is likely a product of the competing Iranian regime factions’ approaches to control over the strait and negotiations with the United States writ large. More Key Takeaways: Iran’s broader military establishment, which appears to currently dominate regime decision-making, maintains its position against significant concessions over the Strait of Hormuz because they assess that Iran can outlast the United States in the war. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and other pro-negotiations officials continue to advocate for diplomacy to settle the conflict and prioritize Iran’s economic challenges, while facing mounting pressure from the other regime factions that oppose compromise and seek more maximalist regional objectives. This intra-regime divide will likely impede Iran’s ability to concretely come to an arrangement over the strait. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appears to be downplaying these intra-regime divisions to portray a unified front against the United States, however. The Supreme Leader’s Public Relations Office on August 4 rejected reports claiming to describe Mojtaba’s reaction to a letter from President Masoud Pezeshkian. The Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that a Houthi drone struck a “sensitive target” at Najran Regional Airport, southern Saudi Arabia, on August 4. An informed regional source told Agence France-Presse (AFP) on August 4 that the Houthis struck the Najran Regional Airport’s main radar installation, which has affected airport operations. The Houthis likely sank an Indian-flagged cargo vessel with a one-way naval attack drone near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. Indian Minister of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways Sarbananda Sonowal announced on August 4 that an unspecified projectile struck and sank the Indian-flagged MSV FAIZE NOORE OLIYA “near Yemeni waters.” (1/2)

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084767309676036164#m

Published: August 4, 2026 22:23

Iran Update Special Report, August 4, 2026: US officials and Iranian negotiators continue to present competing interpretations of the emerging arrangement on the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians’ inconsistent messaging in these negotiations is likely a…

RT by @TheStudyofWar: NEW: The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched an unspecified number of North Korean ballistic missiles between July 29 and 30. Russia is likely using these missiles to exploit Ukraine’s lack of anti-ballistic missile interceptors. North Korea will likely benefit from battlefield use of its systems as it seeks to improve the performance of its military equipment. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: The Workers’ Party of Korea commemorated the 73rd anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement on July 27, taking the opportunity to celebrate the history of North Korea-PRC relations. The 2026 celebration was scaled down compared to the last iteration in 2023 and largely omitted any mention of the United States or South Korea. The South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced on July 29 that it will introduce legislation to accelerate the development of an indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN). The bill will reiterate that South Korea does not seek to develop or possess nuclear weapons, likely to mitigate concerns by US lawmakers and comply with international agreements.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084742644417130977#m

Published: August 4, 2026 20:45

NEW: The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched an unspecified number of North Korean ballistic missiles between July 29 and 30. Russia is likely using these missiles to exploit Ukraine’s lack of anti-ballistic missile interceptors. North Korea…

RT by @TheStudyofWar: Ukraine in the last half of February and in March and April “managed to seize more terrain than the Russians did across the entire theater net-net for the first time since 2023,” says @TheStudyOfWar’s @georgewbarros. “That’s a really big deal,” he tells @ACEurasia’s @JohnEdHerbst.

https://nitter.poast.org/AtlanticCouncil/status/2084660854667034853#m

Published: August 4, 2026 15:20

Ukraine in the last half of February and in March and April “managed to seize more terrain than the Russians did across the entire theater net-net for the first time since 2023,” says @TheStudyOfWar’s @georgewbarros. “That’s a really big deal,” he tells…

LIVE: ISW's @georgewbarros participates in @ACEurasia panel "What is driving Kyiv's campaign to bring the war home to Russia?" The discussion will revolve around the latest battlefield developments in Ukraine and what they could mean for the trajectory of the war.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084642529203396631#m

Published: August 4, 2026 14:08

LIVE: ISW's @georgewbarros participates in @ACEurasia panel "What is driving Kyiv's campaign to bring the war home to Russia?" The discussion will revolve around the latest battlefield developments in Ukraine and what they could mean for the trajectory of…

MORE: Russian forces conducted a campaign that generated partial BAI effects to facilitate subsequent ground advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions over several months in late 2025. Russian forces used a combination of drones, missiles, and glide bombs in their 2025 BAI campaign to strike targets such as Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), vehicles, training grounds, and railways and isolate Ukrainian logistics in both Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole. Russian forces appear to again be engaging in a similar BAI campaign in 2026, now targeting Slovyansk and Kramatorsk — the cities that make up the northern tip of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. The main objective of the ongoing Russian BAI campaign against the Fortress Belt — as with previous BAI campaigns — is to isolate Ukrainian forces defending the Fortress Belt from sustained logistics. Ukrainian and Russian sources have repeatedly commented on the negative effects that Russian strikes are having on Ukrainian logistics, recently noting that nighttime logistics missions in Kramatorsk and Slovyansk are difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct. Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian locomotives that are critical for Ukrainian logistics, for example, and the Russian military command reportedly provided Russian troops with 1,000 Molniya fixed-wing loitering munitions in July 2026 and issued orders to intensify strikes against Ukrainian logistics in and near Kramatorsk. Russian forces are also starting to strike major bridges in the Fortress Belt area to further disrupt Ukrainian logistics. Geolocated footage posted on August 2 shows the aftermath of a recent Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike that heavily damaged the Cherivkovsky Bridge over the Kazennyi Torets River in eastern Slovyansk. The bridge connects Slovyansk to the H-20 highway and leads to Kramatorsk. Russian milbloggers noted that the bridge served as an important Ukrainian logistics route between Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and claimed that it was one of three bridges in Slovyansk capable of handling heavy vehicles. The ongoing Russian BAI campaign aims to shape the battlefield ahead of planned Russian offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the future, although Russian forces remain unlikely to advance quickly to or through these cities in the near term. Russian forces have been infiltrating Kostyantynivka in recent months but have not seized the city, despite Russian claims otherwise. The situation in and near the city is deteriorating, however, and fighting will likely continue in Kostyantynivka for several weeks as Russian forces try to consolidate the positions they have gained through infiltrations. Russian infiltrators are already starting to move north of the city toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka. Russian forces are also attempting to infiltrate and seize Lyman (northeast of Slovyansk), but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces have entered the town. Russian forces nonetheless are likely preparing now for intended future offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Russia’s 2025 BAI campaigns notably took months to set conditions for subsequent advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084632953083383882#m

Published: August 4, 2026 13:30

MORE: Russian forces conducted a campaign that generated partial BAI effects to facilitate subsequent ground advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions over several months in late 2025. Russian forces used a combination of drones, missiles, and…

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 3, 2026: Russian forces are replicating aspects of their Summer-Fall 2025 battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that set conditions for late 2025 advances near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole to prepare for offensive operations against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. More Key Takeaways: The main objective of the ongoing Russian BAI campaign against the Fortress Belt — as with previous BAI campaigns — is to isolate Ukrainian forces defending the Fortress Belt from sustained logistics. The ongoing Russian BAI campaign aims to shape the battlefield ahead of planned Russian offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the future, although Russian forces remain unlikely to advance quickly to or through these cities in the near term. Russian forces appear to be more heavily relying on glide bomb strikes in their 2026 BAI campaign compared to their 2025 campaigns. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced more personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on August 3. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on August 3. Russia launched 181 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military assets on August 3. (1/2)

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084468233021653323#m

Published: August 4, 2026 02:35

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 3, 2026: Russian forces are replicating aspects of their Summer-Fall 2025 battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that set conditions for late 2025 advances near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole to prepare for…

Pinned: Iran Update Special Report, August 3, 2026: Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei may be trying to reduce President Masoud Pezeshkian and other “pragmatist” officials’ ability to influence the regime’s approach toward the United States in the current conflict. Senior cleric Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, who has familial ties to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, claimed on August 3 that Mojtaba formally warned Pezeshkian that he would accept Pezeshkian’s resignation if Pezeshkian tried to resign again. Mojtaba may have made this warning to prevent Pezeshkian from using the threat of his resignation to influence regime policies. Other Key Takeaways: Kharrazi’s comments come as a contingent of “pragmatist” regime officials has directly and indirectly questioned how much effort the regime should exert to control the Strait of Hormuz. Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who played a central role in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations, warned on August 3 that a prolonged closure or “short-term exploitation” of the Strait of Hormuz could generate an international consensus against Iran, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) faction that currently appears to be dominating regime decision-making has likely not diverged from its maximalist positions and will likely maintain these positions in reported upcoming talks with the United States, however. Supreme Leader Military Adviser Major General Mohsen Rezaei, whom ISW-CTP assesses is part of the IRGC faction controlling regime decision-making, stated on August 3 that Iran will not allow the use of a second corridor in the strait “under any circumstances.” The IRGC continued to use force to assert Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz on August 2, which reflects the IRGC’s unwillingness to compromise on its control over the waterway. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 2 that an explosion occurred near a civilian vessel off the coast of Oman. Mojtaba may be trying to increase his influence over key regime institutions, including the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Kharrazi claimed that Mojtaba wants to replace Vahidi-appointed SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr with one of his military advisers, former IRGC Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei. Iranian outlet Tabnak, which is affiliated with Rezaei, notably circulated Kharrazi’s claim. (1/2)

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084422998178599418#m

Published: August 3, 2026 23:35

Iran Update Special Report, August 3, 2026: Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei may be trying to reduce President Masoud Pezeshkian and other “pragmatist” officials’ ability to influence the regime’s approach toward the United States in the current…

Key Takeaway: An arrangement in which Iran controls inbound traffic in the Strait of Hormuz would still enable Iran to control which vessels can enter the Persian Gulf and thus continue to undermine the United States’ interests as well as global commerce.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084300761157300579#m

Published: August 3, 2026 15:30

Key Takeaway: An arrangement in which Iran controls inbound traffic in the Strait of Hormuz would still enable Iran to control which vessels can enter the Persian Gulf and thus continue to undermine the United States’ interests as well as global commerce. …

RT by @TheStudyofWar: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi committed to hold a Congolese national dialogue. Tshisekedi and his allies may be using the dialogue to buy time and political space, as they are simultaneously advancing unilateral efforts to change the constitution and reorganize for the war against M23 rebels in the eastern DRC, both of which could alienate opposition factions in the dialogue. 🧵⬇️

https://nitter.poast.org/criticalthreats/status/2084272847128522798#m

Published: August 3, 2026 13:39

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi committed to hold a Congolese national dialogue. Tshisekedi and his allies may be using the dialogue to buy time and political space, as they are simultaneously advancing unilateral efforts…

NEW: An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in central Moscow City on August 1, potentially targeting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko. It is unclear as of this writing if the explosion killed or injured Chayko. Other Key Takeaways: Russian forces are leveraging new jet-powered Banderol loitering munitions and Geran-4 Seeker drones in their strike campaigns against Ukraine’s Black Sea port infrastructure and railway infrastructure. Ukrainian forces recently struck multiple oil refineries, a strategic bomber base, and a Wildberries warehouse in Russia. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 2. Russia launched 133 drones against Ukraine overnight.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084065188110585927#m

Published: August 2, 2026 23:53

NEW: An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in central Moscow City on August 1, potentially targeting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko. It is unclear as of this writing if the explosion killed or injured…

MORE: IRGC-affiliated Fars News denied on August 2 that Iran agreed to a plan to reopen the strait. An informed Iranian military source told Fars News that the strait will remain closed as long as the United States continues to conduct “hostile actions.” The source added that vessels can only transit through Iran’s traffic separation scheme and with permission from the IRGC Navy. This report highlights how some IRGC factions, likely including Vahidi’s faction, seek to retain full control over all traffic in the strait and likely oppose an arrangement in which Iran would only control inbound traffic in the strait. The IRGC controls the forces that have repeatedly attacked shipping in the strait in recent months, and it could therefore try to undermine an arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz that it deems contrary to the regime’s interests. Iranian negotiators’ reported openness to the US- and Qatari-formulated proposal is consistent with Iranian “pragmatist” actors’ support for negotiating a diplomatic settlement to advance Iranian objectives. “Pragmatist” officials such as Araghchi, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and President Masoud Pezeshkian have consistently advocated for using diplomacy to secure Iranian interests, such as securing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and obtaining economic relief. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has repeatedly voiced concerns about the economic costs of war, and he convinced Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to accept the memorandum of understanding (MoU) in June by highlighting the MoU’s economic benefits.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084040451364176270#m

Published: August 2, 2026 22:15

MORE: IRGC-affiliated Fars News denied on August 2 that Iran agreed to a plan to reopen the strait. An informed Iranian military source told Fars News that the strait will remain closed as long as the United States continues to conduct “hostile actions.”…

Pinned: NEW: Iranian negotiators such as Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi may be willing to make limited compromises with the United States over the extent of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) faction led by IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, which appears to be currently dominating regime decision-making, will likely reject any arrangement that meaningfully reduces Iranian control over the waterway, however. Other Key Takeaways: US President Donald Trump stated on August 1 that he canceled planned strikes on Iran after Iran — presumably referring to Iranian negotiators — and regional states informed him that they had agreed on the parameters of a deal that reportedly includes the “immediate, complete, and total opening” of the strait and “an end to Iran’s nuclear threat.” Israeli media also reported on August 2 that Araghchi agreed to a US- and Qatari-formulated proposal in which vessels would enter the Persian Gulf through Iranian waters and exit through Omani waters. An arrangement in which Iran controls inbound traffic in the Strait of Hormuz would still enable Iran to control which vessels can enter the Persian Gulf and thus continue to undermine the United States’ interests as well as global commerce. Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that they seek to prevent “hostile” vessels, including US Navy vessels, from entering the Persian Gulf. Some Iranian regime officials may be seeking to appease ultra-hardliners by emphasizing that the regime is exploiting pauses in US military operations and periods of diplomacy to reconstitute military capabilities and import new equipment. Iranian Artesh Spokesperson Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia explicitly stated on August 2 that Iran “fully exploited” the MoU and ceasefire to import new equipment, repair and reconstruct damaged systems, and produce new systems.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2084022829222068269#m

Published: August 2, 2026 21:05

NEW: Iranian negotiators such as Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi may be willing to make limited compromises with the United States over the extent of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) faction…

R to @TheStudyofWar: 2/ The Kremlin is desperately attempting to disguise its slow rate of advance in Ukraine through exaggerated claims of advance, but even Moscow’s claimed rate of advance is only about footpace. Russian forces have advanced, infiltrated, or claimed to have advanced in 18.49 square kilometers per day in July 2026. The Kremlin and senior Russian military command have leaned into their cognitive warfare campaign, attempting to falsely show that Russian forces are advancing in all sectors of the front, that Ukrainian lines are collapsing, and that the West should abandon Ukraine as a hopeless cause. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin newswire TASS each made exaggerated claims on July 31 about the number of settlements that Russian forces allegedly seized in July 2026 as part of this informational effort. This Russian informational effort also likely aims to convince Russians that the sacrifices they are making for the war, including the staggering casualty rates, economic burden, Ukrainian strikes in Russia, and Kremlin censorship measures, are worth it.[9] But even the Kremlin’s most extensive claims do not have Russian forces advancing faster than footpace, a rate of advance far slower than the Kremlin would need to collapse Ukrainian lines and rapidly seize the areas Moscow reportedly aims to capture by the end of 2026.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083965627740364807#m

Published: August 2, 2026 17:18

2/ The Kremlin is desperately attempting to disguise its slow rate of advance in Ukraine through exaggerated claims of advance, but even Moscow’s claimed rate of advance is only about footpace. Russian forces have advanced, infiltrated, or claimed to have…

MORE 🧵(1/2): Russian forces reportedly suffered the highest casualty rate of 2026 thus far in July, paying an increasingly high price for no significant increase in the rate of advance — despite the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to deny this fact. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 1 that Russian forces suffered 42,860 casualties in July 2026, a new monthly high for the war. The Ukrainian General Staff’s data indicates that Russian casualties have been steadily increasing since February 2026, when Russian forces suffered 26,090 casualties. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 31 that Russian forces have suffered almost 700,000 killed in action (KIA) and about 1.6 million total casualties since February 2022. The Ukrainian General Staff’s casualty rates indicate that Russian forces suffered an average of 353 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized or infiltrated in July 2026, and a staggering 1,132 casualties per square kilometer seized.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083965624846283050#m

Published: August 2, 2026 17:18

MORE 🧵(1/2): Russian forces reportedly suffered the highest casualty rate of 2026 thus far in July, paying an increasingly high price for no significant increase in the rate of advance — despite the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to deny this fact. The…

MORE: ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in 37.85 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine (smaller than the area of Manhattan) in July 2026 for an average of 1.22 square kilometers per day. Russia’s monthly rate of advance has not changed significantly since February 2026, prior to the start of its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, which began in mid-March 2026. Russian forces have infiltrated into more territory in July 2026 than in recent months, advancing or infiltrating into about 121.56 square kilometers of territory in all. Even the Russian rate of advance and infiltration in July 2026 is a fraction of Russia’s rate of advance in July 2025, when Russian forces seized 455.74 square kilometers. Russian forces leaned into conducting additional infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast in July 2026, but Russia’s increased infiltrations have not resulted in the seizure of Kostyantynivka or the achievement of any operationally significant objectives. The Russian monthly rate of advance in 2026 has been much lower than Russia’s rate of advance during the same period in 2025, even when including infiltrations. Continued Ukrainian counterattacks, Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign, and Ukrainian drone dominance continue to constrain Russia’s rate of advance and ability to field mechanized vehicles. Russian forces have conducted a few mechanized assaults in isolated areas of the theater in July 2026, but these assaults did not result in meaningful gains. The Kremlin has been optimizing the Russian military for positional warfare rather than maneuver warfare for several years, but Ukrainian adaptations are significantly slowing Russian advances in 2026 compared with previous years. There is no indication that Russian forces will be able to accelerate their advances dramatically or restore maneuver to the battlefield at this time.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083760691379409127#m

Published: August 2, 2026 03:43

MORE: ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in 37.85 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine (smaller than the area of Manhattan) in July 2026 for an average of 1.22 square kilometers per day. Russia’s monthly rate of…

MORE: Iran issued these threats after Western media reported that the United States and Israel are considering conducting large-scale strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure. An Iranian analyst close to the regime stated on August 1 that an attack on Iranian infrastructure would be a “terrifying scenario for everyone” and urged regional and international actors to prevent the “crisis.” Iran likely seeks to prevent US or US-Israeli combined force operations by signaling that any attack on Iran’s energy sector would trigger Iranian retaliatory strikes against regional critical infrastructure.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083749634913321029#m

Published: August 2, 2026 03:00

MORE: Iran issued these threats after Western media reported that the United States and Israel are considering conducting large-scale strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure. An Iranian analyst close to the regime stated on August 1 that an attack on…

NEW: The Russian rate of advance in Ukraine remains low two and a half months into the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, which has failed to make any operationally significant gains. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: Russian forces reportedly suffered the highest casualty rate of 2026 thus far in July, paying an increasingly high price for no significant increase in the rate of advance — despite the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to deny this fact. The Kremlin is desperately attempting to disguise its slow rate of advance in Ukraine through exaggerated claims of advance, but even Moscow’s claimed rate of advance is only about footpace. Russian forces continued to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles by launching another large ballistic missile and drone strike series against Ukraine overnight on July 31 to August 1, primarily targeting Kyiv Oblast. Russian forces launched a record number of missiles against Ukraine in July 2026 — notably firing more missiles than it is producing per month and increasingly leveraging its S-400 and Zirkon missiles to compensate for shortfalls in ballistic missile stockpiles. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and gasoline infrastructure in Russia on July 31 and August 1. Russian forces are reportedly increasing the intensity of drone and glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian fuel and energy infrastructure, including gas stations. Russian forces are increasingly targeting Ukrainian civilian logistical centers and warehouses. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 1.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083728392105419212#m

Published: August 2, 2026 01:35

NEW: The Russian rate of advance in Ukraine remains low two and a half months into the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, which has failed to make any operationally significant gains. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: Russian forces reportedly suffered the…

Pinned: NEW: Iran is threatening to target energy infrastructure in the Middle East, likely to try to deter the United States and Israel from following through on reported plans to strike Iranian energy infrastructure. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: The IRGC reportedly used the US-Iran ceasefire in April 2026 to coordinate with the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias to expand the conflict and increase the costs of US military operations. Two senior IRGC officers told the New York Times on August 1 that senior IRGC Quds Force officers held calls with Hezbollah, Houthi, and Iraqi militia commanders during the ceasefire to coordinate efforts to expand the conflict with the United States. The IRGC officers’ decision to speak with the New York Times now is likely part of the Iranian information effort to try to deter US and Israeli strikes against Iranian critical infrastructure. Kuwaiti air defenses intercepted an unspecified number of Iranian drones targeting Kuwait on August 1. Iran has not claimed nor commented on this attack at the time of this writing. Iran continues to illegally assert control over the Strait of Hormuz with force by attacking civilian vessels that attempt to use non-Iranian-approved routes through the strait. Iran’s attacks on commercial shipping are also likely intended to impose economic costs on the global economy to erode the United States’ willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iranian demands.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083699764416172277#m

Published: August 1, 2026 23:41

NEW: Iran is threatening to target energy infrastructure in the Middle East, likely to try to deter the United States and Israel from following through on reported plans to strike Iranian energy infrastructure. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: The IRGC…

R to @TheStudyofWar: 2/ Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in some areas of northern Ukraine, contradicting the Russian narrative of theater-wide and unchallenged advances. Prominent Kremlin co-opted milbloggers are notably refuting the official Russian military narrative about the situation in northern Ukraine. Ukrainian defense company F-Drones delivered the first 2,000 first-person view (FPV) drones to the US military as part of the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) Drone Dominance Program. Russia launched 255 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083385281705619906#m

Published: August 1, 2026 02:52

2/ Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in some areas of northern Ukraine, contradicting the Russian narrative of theater-wide and unchallenged advances. Prominent Kremlin co-opted milbloggers are notably refuting the official Russian military narrative…

NEW: The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are likely lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine in order to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire theater, including a part of the frontline that has been largely stagnant for nearly two years. 🧵(1/3) The Kremlin is using these exaggerated claims of advance as part of its ongoing cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian forces as advancing across the battlefield in order to convince Ukraine’s partners to abandon their support. Available battlefield evidence does not corroborate Russian claims of advances in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Other Key Takeaways ⬇️

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083385249434603605#m

Published: August 1, 2026 02:52

NEW: The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are likely lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine in order to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire…

MORE | Iranian Strike Campaign: The Artesh announced on July 30 that it launched drones against Ahmed al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait and targeted fighter aircraft storage facilities, satellite communications systems, and equipment warehouses. A US Department of Defense official told the New York Times that Iran launched multiple projectiles overnight but that US bases in the region did not sustain major damage. Iran has repeatedly attacked US bases and personnel across the region to erode US willingness to challenge Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian leaders likely assess that sustained attacks and US casualties will increase domestic pressure on the United States to end the conflict and accept Iranian control over the strait. Iran nevertheless appears to have limited its regional strikes overnight following the pause in US strikes, possibly to avoid triggering a full-scale US campaign that could threaten key Iranian strategic objectives, including developing its missile and drone programs as well as maintaining its nuclear program.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083334392257429917#m

Published: July 31, 2026 23:30

MORE | Iranian Strike Campaign: The Artesh announced on July 30 that it launched drones against Ahmed al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait and targeted fighter aircraft storage facilities, satellite communications systems, and equipment warehouses. A US Department…

NEW: The United States has not conducted any strikes on Iran since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff. Iran has conducted only one attack against US assets in the region since ISW-CTP’s July 30 data cutoff. This attack was likely part of Iran’s ongoing effort to try to erode US willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Other Key Takeaways: Conflicting Iranian statements about Iran’s role in the recent attack on Egypt are consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that there are divisions among regime factions over the means through which Iran should try to achieve its war aims. The Persian Gulf Strait Authority suggested on July 31 that it will not issue transit permits for vessels to pass through the strait until the United States ends military operations in the region, likely as part of Iran’s effort to impose economic costs on the global economy to erode the United States’ willingness to continue the war. Iran also likely calculates that this economic pressure will coerce the Gulf states to urge the United States to halt its campaign against Iran.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083310020876255609#m

Published: July 31, 2026 21:53

NEW: The United States has not conducted any strikes on Iran since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff. Iran has conducted only one attack against US assets in the region since ISW-CTP’s July 30 data cutoff. This attack was likely part of Iran’s ongoing effort to…

NEW: The Economist reported on July 23 on reports that PLA soldiers have undergone combat training at a Russian military complex. The PLA is likely aiming to improve its ability to conduct unmanned systems warfare and operate in a drone-saturated environment. The PLA is unlikely to wholly adopt what it learns from the Russian military’s experience and instead will likely develop its own methods of adapting to modern warfare. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: The PLAN has likely improved its anti-surface warfare capabilities. The PLAN may seek to develop an asymmetric advantage with its anti-ship missiles to contest sea control beyond the first island chain and ameliorate its other naval combat deficiencies when compared to the US Navy. Philippine Secretary of Defense Gilbert Teodoro Jr. stated that the Philippines cannot remain neutral in a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan due to the population of Filipino citizens living in Taiwan and the very likely involvement of the Bashi Channel in the scope of the conflict. This statement represents one of the strongest Philippine commitments to Taiwan to date.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083261648425361830#m

Published: July 31, 2026 18:40

NEW: The Economist reported on July 23 on reports that PLA soldiers have undergone combat training at a Russian military complex. The PLA is likely aiming to improve its ability to conduct unmanned systems warfare and operate in a drone-saturated…

ISW on Capitol Hill: The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the @HelsinkiComm, held a briefing on Capitol Hill to examine Moscow’s exploitation of unstable security environments and vulnerable populations across Africa amid its war in Ukraine. As part of the panel, ISW’s Russia Team Lead and Deputy Director of the Cognitive Warfare Project @KatStepanenko provided insights into Russia’s Wagner Group and Africa Corps’ recruitment of Africans to fight in Ukraine.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083201677394342286#m

Published: July 31, 2026 14:42

ISW on Capitol Hill: The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the @HelsinkiComm, held a briefing on Capitol Hill to examine Moscow’s exploitation of unstable security environments and vulnerable populations across Africa amid its…

NEW: Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30 that featured a particularly large number of missiles and aimed to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: Russian missile strikes targeted a wide swathe of Ukraine’s deep rear and resulted in high civilian casualties. Russian forces continue to increase the number of missiles while decreasing the number of drones in strike packages, likely to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors, while Ukraine’s drone interception rate remains high. Russia also used at least one North Korean-provided ballistic missile for the first time since Summer 2025 following reported recent North Korean missile deliveries to Russia. A likely Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in eastern Poland during Russia’s large-scale missile strikes against western Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30. Russian missile and drone incursions into NATO territory during Russian strikes on Ukraine appear to be a risk the Kremlin has accepted. Ukrainian forces are attempting to help NATO defend its airspace and territory during large Russian missile and drone strikes that threaten NATO members. Ukraine’s continued strike campaign against Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) throughout Russia is imposing significant costs on the company’s retailers and consumers. Russian authorities appear to be focusing on resolving Wildberries’ supply issues affecting ordinary Russians, as opposed to the more pressing issue of protecting the Russian rear against Ukrainian strikes. Recently appointed Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi is starting to make personnel changes as he takes command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and government continue to undergo personnel shuffles. Russian forces continued their campaigns against Ukrainian port infrastructure and merchant ships. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port and oil infrastructure on the night of July 29 to 30. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 30.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083038487956033867#m

Published: July 31, 2026 03:54

NEW: Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30 that featured a particularly large number of missiles and aimed to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors. (1/2) Other Key…

NEW: The United States conducted a wave of strikes in Iran on July 29 in response to Iranian attacks on US forces on July 28. The majority of recorded US airstrikes targeted Iranian military sites in southern Iran, including targets along the Persian Gulf coastline. (1/2) Other Key Takeaways: Iran is attempting to weaken US resolve to continue its war against Iran by increasing the economic and political costs of ongoing US military operations. Iran possibly conducted or directed the drone attack on a US gas tanker at Damietta Port in northeastern Egypt on July 29. Iran almost certainly recognizes that the northern Red Sea and Suez Canal corridor provides a viable alternative route for international shipping and energy markets to circumvent Iran’s disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is attempting to increase domestic pressure on the US government by inflicting casualties on US forces and material damage to regional bases. Iran also seeks to coerce US partner states into revoking US basing access in the region. The IRGC is asserting that US forces and air defense systems cannot protect US troops or bases, almost certainly as part of a broader information operation that portrays US military presence as a source of insecurity for regional states. Saudi Arabia is assembling a multinational “maritime defense coalition” to protect Red Sea shipping from Houthi and Iranian threats to the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Houthis and Iran will likely view this coalition’s formation as a direct threat to their current regional objectives. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are discussing how to respond to recent US-Saudi airstrikes on militia positions in Iraq. The militias could target US and Saudi interests, including US targets in Iraqi Kurdistan or Baghdad. The Houthis could participate in the Iraqi militias’ response to the US-Saudi strikes. Saudi Arabia and unspecified regional partners reportedly assess that the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia on July 27 from Iraqi territory in coordination with the Iraqi militias and under IRGC supervision. The Houthis’ ability to launch attacks in the region from Iraqi territory expands the group’s options to obfuscate responsibility for the attacks that it is conducting.

https://nitter.poast.org/TheStudyofWar/status/2083000466720333826#m

Published: July 31, 2026 01:23

NEW: The United States conducted a wave of strikes in Iran on July 29 in response to Iranian attacks on US forces on July 28. The majority of recorded US airstrikes targeted Iranian military sites in southern Iran, including targets along the Persian Gulf…